We consider a random number of strategic customers who compete for a limited stock of products, and decide whether to buy a product at full price now or at a discount price by waiting until the end of the selling season. This decision is not trivial, as waiting leads to not only a lower cost, but also less value due to a possible stockout caused by the limited product quantity. The equilibrium analysis of the competition game based on a theoretical model predicts that strategic customers wait for the discount price when their private product valuations at the end of the selling season are above a threshold. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study strategic customers’ decisions and find that significantly fewer customers wait than predicted when the stock quantity is high, but not when the stock quantity is low. Our behavioral models with their structural estimates reveal that the strategic customers’ behavior is caused by decision biases of bounded rationality and risk aversion. These findings imply that a retailer should take account of decision biases when deciding on the optimal stock quantity because the decision biases of strategic customers benefit the retailer when stock quantity is high, but may not benefit them when stock quantity is low.
宋亚楠，博士毕业于清华大学工业工程系，中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院博士后，现任北京科技大学东凌经济管理学院管理科学与工程系副教授，硕士生导师。主要研究领域包括：行为运作管理、共享经济、收益管理、策略型消费者行为等。主持完成博士后面上项目一项，优秀博士后项目一项，正在主持自然科学基金青年基金一项，北京市社会科学基金一项，校人才项目一项。代表作发表于领域内国际顶级期刊《Production & Operations Management》，以及JCR一区期刊《International Journal of Production Economics》等。主要社会任职包括：北京运筹学会理事，中国运筹学会行为运作管理学会理事，INFORMS会员、POMs会员，同时担任了多个知名期刊的审稿人。