We study an assembly system where n upstream complementary suppliers produce components and sell them to a downstream manufacturer. The manufacturer assembles all the components into final products and sells them in the final market. The demand for final products is assumed to be deterministic and sensitive to both the selling price set by the manufacturer and the quality-improvement effort levels of all suppliers. The suppliers may form coalitions to better coordinate their wholesale pricing and quality-improvement effort decisions. We analyze the stability of coalition structures by adopting farsighted stability concepts. To characterize supplier’s profit allocation in a coalition, we consider three allocation rules, including the equal allocations, the proportional allocations and the Shapley value allocations. The results show that the grand coalition is always stable under both the equal allocations and the proportional allocations. However, under the Shapley value allocations, the grand coalition is stable only when the suppliers’ quality efficiencies have relatively small differences. Conditions under which the suppliers will not act independently are presented as well. Because of the positive externalities of quality improvements, we demonstrate that coalitions of suppliers with lower quality efficiencies could benefit from free-riding on the investments of coalitions of suppliers with higher quality efficiencies in the system.
陈俊霖，中央财经大学管理科学与工程学院副教授，清华大学工业工程系博士，美国加州大学伯克利分校访问学者，加拿大圭尔夫大学访问学者。研究方向为供应链风险管理，行为运作管理。目前已在《Decision Sciences》、《European Journal of Operational Research》、《管理科学学报》等国内外知名期刊发表论文数十篇。主持国家自然科学基金青年基金项目、国家自然科学基金中德国际合作研究项目子课题、北京市社科基金一般项目、中财121人才工程青年博士发展基金等项目多项。兼任中国运筹学会行为运筹与管理分会理事、中国运筹学会随机服务与运作管理分会理事。