时间：4月7日（星期四）下午2:30-4:00

腾讯会议号：751465222

报告人：中央财经大学赵健宇助理教授

主讲人简介：

赵健宇，中央财经大学会计学院助理教授，北京大学光华管理学院博士，研究方向为信息披露、税收政策、公司财务与劳动经济学交叉研究。学术成果发表于《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《南开管理评论》、《会计研究》、《金融研究》、Journal of Management Accounting Research等国内外一流期刊。担任《经济研究》、《财贸经济》、《财务研究》、China Finance Review International匿名审稿人。报告内容简介：

We examine whether and how bank interventions affect workplace safety through debt covenant violations. Debt covenant violations allocate control rights to creditors, allowing banks to intervene with corporate policies and decisions. By conducting a regression discontinuity design, we find that bank interventions significantly reduce workplace injuries and improve workplace safety. The effect is more pronounced when firms have limited inputs into safety and burdened workload before the violations, when firms have powerful labor unions, when firms are financially constrained, or when the bank intervention is from relationship banks. Our findings provide strong evidence that creditors play a role in shaping workplace safety and improving overall employee welfare.

（承办：会计系、科研与学术交流中心）